In this paper, we show that the protocol complex of a Byzantine synchronous system can remain (k − 1)-connected for up to ⌈t/k⌉ rounds, where t is the maximum number of Byzantine processes, and t ≥ k ≥ 1. This topological property implies that ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds are necessary to solve k-set agreement in Byzantine synchronous systems, compared to ⌊t/k⌋ + 1 rounds in synchronous crash-failure systems. We also show that our connectivity bound is tight as we indicate solutions to Byzantine k-set agreement in exactly ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 synchronous rounds, at least when n is suitably large compared to t. In conclusion, we see how Byzantine failures can potentially require one extra round to solve k-set agreement, and, for n suitably large compared to t, at most that.
Introduction
A task is a distributed coordination problem where multiple processes start with private inputs, communicate among themselves (by shared memory or message passing), and halt with outputs consistent with the task specification. There are crash-failure systems [1] , where processes can fail only by permanent, unannounced halting, or Byzantine-failure systems [18] , where processes can fail arbitrarily, even maliciously. In synchronous systems, communication and computation are organized in discrete rounds. In each round, each non-faulty process performs as follows, in order: (i) sends a message; (ii) receives all messages sent in the current round by the other processes; and (iii) performs internal computation. In asynchronous systems, processes may have different relative speeds, and communication is subject to unbound, finite delays.
The problem of consensus in the synchronous Byzantine message-passing model was among the earliest to be investigated, and upper and lower consensus bounds in that model are wellunderstood. In this paper, we turn our attention to overall computational power of this model, including bounds for problems such as k-set agreement. We use concepts and techniques adapted from combinatorial topology. In essence, we can capture all possible information dissemination patterns permitted by this model in a single combinatorial structure called a simplicial complex (or just complex ). A classical topological property of a simplicial complex is its level of connectivity, which is, roughly speaking, the dimension below which it has no holes. Many classical proofs of consensus impossibility can be reformulated as showing that certain complexes are 0-connected (also called path-connected), and all known impossibility proofs for k-set agreement rely on showing that certain complexes are (k − 1)-connected. Very informally, the higher the degree of connectivity imposed by the adversary, the weaker the model's computational power. Here, we present the first tight bounds on connectivity for the synchronous Byzantine message-passing model.
Prior work using topological techniques is discussed in Sec. 2. Our operational setting is detailed in Sec. 3, and our topological model is formalized in Sec. 4 .
Our first contribution comes in Sec. 5 . We show that, in a Byzantine synchronous system, the protocol complex can remain (k − 1)-connected for ⌈t/k⌉ rounds, where t is an upper bound on the number of Byzantine processes. Perhaps surprisingly, this is only one more round than the upper bound for crash-failure systems (⌊t/k⌋, shown in [8] ). Technically, we conceive a combinatorial operator modeling the ability of Byzantine processes to equivocate -that is, to transmit ambiguous state information -without revealing their Byzantine nature. We compose this operator with regular crash-failure operators, extending the protocol complex connectivity for one extra round. As noted, connectivity is of interest because a (k − 1)-connected protocol complex prevents important problems such as k-set agreement [7, 9] from having solutions.
Our second contribution comes in Sec. 6. We show that the above connectivity bound is tight in certain settings (described in Sec. 6), by solving k-set agreement in ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds. We do so with a full-information protocol that assumes n suitably large compared to t. The protocol suits well our purpose of tightening the ⌈t/k⌉ bound, and also exposes clearly the reason why ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds is enough to solve k-set agreement.
These results give new insight into the power of Byzantine adversaries for problems beyond consensus. Although Byzantine adversaries seem much more powerful than crash-failure ones, we show that a Byzantine adversary can impose at most one additional synchronous round beyond that imposed by a crash-failure adversary. In terms of solvability vs. number of rounds, the penalty for moving from crash to Byzantine failures, captured by (k − 1)-connectivity in the protocol complex, can be quite limited in synchronous systems, particularly when n is relatively large compared to t.
Related Work
The Byzantine failure model was initially introduced by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [18] . The use of simplicial complexes to model distributed computations was introduced by Herlihy and Shavit [15] . The asynchronous computability theorem for general tasks in [16] details the approach for asynchronous wait-free computation in the crash-failure model. This model was recently generalized by Gafni, Kuznetsov, and Manolescu [10] . Computability in Byzantine asynchronous systems, where tasks are constrained in terms of non-faulty inputs, was recently considered in [19] .
The k-set agreement problem was originally defined by Chaudhuri [7] . Alternative formulations with different validity notions, or failure/communication settings, are discussed in [22, 9] . A full characterization of optimal translations between different failure settings is given in [2, 23] , which requires different number of rounds depending on the relation between the number of faulty processes, and the number of participating processes.
The relationship between connectivity and the impossibility of k-set agreement is described explicitly or implicitly in [8, 16, 24] . Recent work by Castaeda, Gonczarowski, and Moses [6] considers an issue of chains of hidden values, a concept loosely explored here. The approach based on shellability and layered executions for lower bounds in connectivity has been used by Herlihy, Rajsbaum, and Tuttle [14, 13, 12] , assuming crash-failure systems, synchronous or asynchronous.
Operational Model
We have n+1 processes 1 P = {P 0 , . . . , P n } communicating by message-passing via pairwise, reliable, FIFO channels (authenticated channels in the literature [5] ). Technically, all transmitted messages are delivered uniquely, in FIFO order, and with sender reliably identified.
At most t processes are faulty or Byzantine [18] , and may display arbitrary, even malicious behavior, at any point in the execution. The actual behavior of Byzantine processes is defined by an adversary. Byzantine processes may execute the protocol correctly or incorrectly, at the discretion of the adversary. Processes behaving in strict accordance to the protocol for rounds 1 up to some r (inclusive) are called non-faulty processes up to round r, and are denoted by G r . A non-faulty process up to any round r ≥ 1 is called simply non-faulty or correct, which we denote by G.
We model processes as state machines. The input value (resp. output value) of a non-faulty process P i is written I i (resp. O i ). Byzantine processes may have "apparent" inputs, denoted as above. Each non-faulty process P i has an internal state called view, which we denote by view(P i ). In the beginning of the protocol, view(P i ) is I i . At any round r, any non-faulty process: (1) sends its internal state to all other processes; (2) receives the state information from other processes; (3) concatenates that information to its own internal state. After completing some number of iterations, each process applies a decision function δ to its current state in order to decide O i . Thus, we assume that processes follow a full-information protocol [13] .
For simplicity of notation, we define a round 0 where processes are simply assigned their inputs. Without losing generality, all processes are assumed non-faulty up to round 0: G 0 = P and B 0 = ∅. For any round r ≥ 0, a global state formally specifies: (1) the non-faulty processes up to round r; and (2) the view of all non-faulty processes up to round r.
Topological Model
We now sketch the required concepts from combinatorial topology. For details, please refer to Munkres [20] , Kozlov [17] , or Herlihy et al. [11] .
Basics. A simplicial complex K consists of a finite set V along with a collection of subsets of V closed under containment. An element of V is called a vertex of K. The set of vertices of K is referred by V (K). Each set in K is called a simplex, usually denoted by lower-case Greek letters: σ, τ , etc. The dimension dim(σ) of a simplex σ is |σ| − 1.
A subset of a simplex is called a face. The collection of faces of σ with dimension exactly x is called Faces
We use "k-simplex" as shorthand for "k-dimensional simplex", also in "k-face." The dimension dim(K) of a complex is the maximal dimension of its simplexes, and a facet of K is any simplex having maximal dimension in K. A complex is said pure if all facets have dimension dim(K). The set of simplexes of K having dimension at most ℓ is a subcomplex of K, which is called ℓ-skeleton of K, denoted by skel
Although we defined simplexes and complexes in a purely combinatorial way, they can also be interpreted geometrically. An n-simplex can be identified with the convex hull of (n + 1) affinelyindependent points in the Euclidean space of appropriate dimension. This geometric realization can be extended to complexes. The point-set that underlies such geometric complex K is called the polyhedron of K, denoted by |K|. For any simplex σ, the boundary of σ, which we denote ∂ σ, is the simplicial complex of (dim(σ) − 1)-faces of σ. The interior of σ is defined as Int σ = |σ| \ | ∂ σ|.
We can define simplicial/carrier maps between geometrical complexes. Given a simplicial map φ : K → L (resp. carrier map Φ : K → 2 L ), the polyhedrons of every simplex in K and L induce a continuous simplicial map φ c : |K| → |L| (resp. continuous carrier map
Connectivity. In light of topology, two geometrical objects A and B are homeomorphic if, there is a continuous map from A into B or vice-versa. Technically, there exists a continuous map between those objects, in either direction [21, 20] . We say that a simplicial complex K is x-connected, x ≥ 0, if every continuous map of a subset of |K| homeomorphic to an x-sphere in |K| can be extended into a subset of |K| homeomorphic to an (x + 1)-disk in |K|. In analogy, think of the extremes of a pencil as a 0-disk, and the pencil itself as a 1-sphere (the extension is possible if 0-connected); the rim of a coin as a 1-sphere, and the coin itself as a 2-disk (the extension is possible if 1-connected); the outer layer of a billiard ball as a 2-sphere, and the billiard ball itself as a 3-disk (the extension is possible if 2-connected). For us, (−1)-connected is understood as non-empty, and (−2)-connected or lower imposes no restriction.
where each S i is an arbitrary set and
Essentially, a pseudosphere is a simplicial complex formed by independently assigning values to all the specified processes. If S i = S for all P i ∈ P ′ , we simply write Ψ(P ′ , S). Definition 4.2. A pure, simplicial complex K is shellable if we can arrange the facets of K in a linear order φ 0 . . . , φ t such that 0≤i<k φ i ∩ φ k is a pure (dim(φ k ) − 1)-dimensional simplicial complex for all 0 < k ≤ t. We call the above linear order φ 0 , . . . , φ t a shelling order.
Intuitively, a simplicial complex is shellable if it can be built by gluing its x-simplexes along their (x − 1) faces only, where x is the dimension of the complex. Note that φ 0 , . . . , φ t is a shelling order if any
Shellability and pseudospheres are important tools to characterize connectivity in simplicial complexes. The following lemmas are proved in [12] and [11] (pp. 252-253).
Nerve Theorem. Let K be a simplicial complex with a cover {K i : i ∈ I} = K, where I is a finite index set. The nerve N ({K i : i ∈ I}) is the simplicial complex with vertexes I and simplexes J ⊆ I whenever K J = j∈J K j = ∅. We can characterize the connectivity of K in terms of the connectivity of the intuitively simpler nerve of K with the next theorem. 
Protocol Complexes. We represent the evolution of the global state of the system throughout the rounds by simplicial complexes that we call protocol complexes. Definition 4.6. For r ≥ 0, a name-view simplex σ is such that: (i) σ = {(P i , view r (P i )) : ∀P i ∈ G r }, where view r (P i ) denotes P i 's view at round r; and (ii) if (P i , view r (P i )) and (P j , view r (P j )) are both in σ, then P i = P j .
Unless otherwise noted, all of our simplicial and carrier maps f are such that names(σ) = names(f (σ)), that is, they map between vertices associated with the same processes.
Definition 4.7. For any name-view simplex σ, define names(σ) = {P i : ∃V such that (P i , V ) ∈ σ} and views(σ) = {V i : ∃P such that (P, V i ) ∈ σ}.
The round-0 protocol complex K 0 has name-view n-simplexes σ I = {(P i , I i ) : ∀P i ∈ G 0 }, representing all the possible process inputs in the beginning of the protocol. The round-r protocol complex K r , for any r ≥ 0, is defined as follows: if σ ∈ K r , then σ = {(P i , view r (P i )) : ∀P i ∈ G r }, representing a possible global state of the system for round r.
Connectivity Upper Bound
Informally, if the adversary displays Byzantine behavior early in the execution, then in a synchronous, full-information protocol, subsequent communication among the non-faulty processes can reveal the identities of the Byzantine processes, using simple techniques inspired from [2, 4, 25] . Instead, it behooves the adversary to postpone malicious behavior to the very last round, where it cannot detected.
Say that non-faulty processes start the computation with inputs in V = {v 0 , . . . , v d }, arbitrarily assigned, with some d ≥ k and t ≥ k ≥ 1. To prove our upper bound, we show how the adversary can impose a particular admissible execution that preserves high connectivity in the protocol complex.
Let r = ⌊t/k⌋ and m = t mod k. We have r crash rounds, where in each round k processes fail by crashing, but display no Byzantine behavior. If m > 0, we have an extra equivocation round, where a single Byzantine process sends different views to different processes, causing extra confusion. This round-by-round execution produces a sequence of protocol complexes K 0 , . . . , K r+1 , related by carrier maps C i :
In each of the first r rounds, exactly k processes are failed by the adversary. The crash-failure carrier maps are defined as follows [12, 11] : Definition 5.1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the crash-failure operator C i :
for any σ ∈ K i−1 , with [τ : σ] denoting the set of simplexes µ where τ ⊆ µ ⊆ σ.
After r rounds, note that K r only contains simplexes with dimension exactly n − rk. In [12, 11] called equivocation) , but, informally speaking, all views are "plausible." For example, two non-faulty processes P i and P j could be indecisive after round r on whether the global state is σ 1 or σ 2 in K r , while P b , a Byzantine process, sends a state corresponding to σ 1 to P i , and a state corresponding to σ 2 to P j . The faulty process P b does not reveal its Byzantine nature, yet it promotes ambiguity in the state information diffusion.
At the final round, when a non-faulty process receives the states sent from the other processes, it must decide correctly even if one other process equivocates. If the non-faulty process can receive simplexes σ 1 and σ 2 , representing global states that differ in only one process's contribution (that is, dim(σ 1 ∩σ 2 ) = n−rk−1), then the interpretation of a message containing one such state must be the same as a message containing the other. We capture this notion using the equivocation operator, called E, describing the behavior of a Byzantine process, coupled with an interpretation operator, called Interp, describing the required behavior of non-faulty processes. Informally, Interp(σ 1 ) = Interp(σ 2 ) for processes in names(τ ), where τ = σ 1 ∩ σ 2 with dim(τ ) = n − rk − 1. Formally: Definition 5.6. For any simplexes σ 1 and σ 2 in K, with dim(K) = n − rk, let (P i , Interp(σ 1 )) = (P i , Interp(σ 2 )) if and only if σ 1 = σ 2 ; or P i ∈ names(τ ) where τ = σ 1 ∩ σ 2 and dim(τ ) = n − rk − 1.
Definition 5.7. For any pure simplicial complexes K and L with dim(K) ≤ n − rk and K ⊇ L, the
Note that E K (L) = ∅ whenever dim(L) < n − rk − 1 or dim(K) < n − rk, and also that
for any σ ∈ K with dim(σ) = n − rk. For convenience of notation, define E K (K) = E(K). Next, we investigate some technical properties of these constructions that allow us to prove that the final complex is (k − 1)-connected.
Lemma 5.8. For any pure, shellable simplicial complex with dim(K) ≤ n − rk, the K-equivocation operator E K is a carrier map.
Otherwise, if dim(τ ) = dim(σ) then τ = σ and E K (τ ) = E K (σ), as we assumed that σ ⊇ τ ∈ K. The remaining case is when dim(τ ) = n−rk−1 and dim(σ) = n−rk, which makes E K (τ ) ⊆ E K (σ) in light of Definition 5.7.
Let (C r • E) be the composite map such that (C r • E)(σ) = E C r (σ) (C r (σ)). While, for an arbitrary complex K, E K is not a strict carrier map per se, we show in the following lemmas that (C r • E) is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map. Lemma 5.9 shows that (C r • E) is a strict carrier map, and Lemma 5.10 shows that for any σ ∈ K r−1 , (
Lemma 5.9. (C r • E) is a strict carrier map.
Proof. Consider σ, τ ∈ K r−1 , with L = C r (σ) and M = C r (τ ). Both L and M are pure, shellable simplicial complexes with dimension n − rk (Definition 5.1 and Lemma 5.4). Therefore, both the L-equivocation and M-equivocation operators are well-defined. Also, C r is a strict carrier map,
if not empty, is a pure, shellable simplicial complex with dimension n − rk. Therefore, the (L ∩ M)-equivocation operator is well-defined.
First, we show that
, which implies one direction of our equality:
For clarity, let
For arbitrary µ ∈ F (L) and ν ∈ F (M), if E L (µ) ∩ E M (ν) = ∅, consider two cases:
1. µ and ν are proper faces of φ ∈ (L ∩ M). In this case,
By Definition 5.6, the above is non-empty only when Interp(φ 1 ) = Interp(α) with α ∈ L, Interp(φ 2 ) = Interp(β) with β ∈ M, and there exists a non-empty set P ′ such that P ′ ⊆ names(µ) ∩ names(ν) ⊆ names(γ), where γ = α ∩ β with dim(γ) = n − rk − 1. Let P ′′ be a maximal
Since (L ∩ M) is non-empty, it is pure, shellable with dimension n − rk, there must exist a simplex γ ′ ⊃ γ with dimension n − rk. Moreover, Interp(γ ′ ) = Interp(α) = Interp(φ 1 ) and Interp(γ ′ ) = Interp(β) = Interp(φ 2 ) for processes in names(γ), given the definition of Interp.
In conclusion, we have
In the other direction, we have E(L∩M)
7); and (ii) E L is a carrier map (Lemma 5.8). The same argument proves that E(L ∩ M) ⊆ E(M), and therefore E(L ∩ M) ⊆ E(L) ∩ E(M).

Lemma 5.10. For any
Proof. Consider σ ∈ K r−1 with codim K r−1 (σ) ≤ k. By Lemma 5.4, M = C r (σ) is a pure, shellable simplicial complex with dim(M) = n − rk = d. By Definition 5.7, E(M) is well-defined and dim(E(M)) = n − rk − 1 = d ′ . Note that d ′ ≥ n − t ≥ 2t ≥ 2k, since n + 1 > 3t and t ≥ k.
First, we show that E(M) is "highly-connected" -that is, (2k − 1)-connected. We proceed by induction on µ 0 . . . µ ℓ , a shelling order of facets of M.
Base. We show that E M (µ 0 ) is (2k − 1)-connected. Considering Definition 5.7, we have that 
Note that X is (2k − 1)-connected by an argument identical to the one above for the base case E M (µ 0 ). Besides,
where i ∈ S is such that (∪ 0≤y<x µ y ) ∩ µ x = ∪ i∈S τ i . The set S is well-defined since M is shellable. The step (⋆) holds because: (i) Y ∩ X must include at least i∈S E M (τ i ); and (ii)
) exists, the latter inside ψ ′ = Ψ(names(τ j ); Interp(µ x )) for some j ∈ S, or we contradict the fact that M is shellable.
Using an argument identical to the one for E M (µ 0 ), yet considering the cover {E M (τ i ) : i ∈ S}, the nerve of X ∩ Y is either the (d − 1)-skeleton of S (if S = {0 . . . d}) or the whole simplex S (otherwise). By the Nerve Theorem,
Once again, using the Nerve Theorem, since Y is (2k − 1)-connected, X is (2k − 1)-connected, and Y ∩ X is (2k − 1)-connected, we have that Y ∪ X is (2k − 1)-connected.
While the equivocation operator yields high connectivity (2k − 1) in the pseudosphere C r (σ), the composition of C r and E C r (σ) (C r (σ)) limits the connectivity to (k − 1), since the former map is only defined for simplexes with codimension ≤ k. Formally, as C r (σ) = ∅ for any simplex σ ∈ K r−1 with
From Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10, we conclude the following.
Theorem 5.12. An adversary can keep the protocol complex of a Byzantine synchronous system (k − 1)-connected for ⌈t/k⌉ rounds.
Proof. If m = 0, t mod k = 0, and the adversary runs only the crash rounds failing k processes each time, for r = ⌊t/k⌋ = ⌈t/k⌉ consecutive rounds. We have the following scenario:
is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map for any facet σ ∈ I (Lemma 5.5).
If m > 0, the adversary performs r crash rounds (failing k processes each time), followed by the extra equivocation round. We have the following scenario: 
k-Set Agreement and Lower Bound
The k-set agreement problem and connectivity are closely related. Lemma 6.1, proved in Appendix A, shows that no solution is possible for k-set agreement with a (k − 1)-connected protocol complex, which, as seen in Sec. 5, can occur at least until round ⌈t/k⌉.
Lemma 6.1. If, starting σ ∈ I, the protocol complex P(σ) is (k − 1)-connected, then no decision function δ solves the k-set agreement problem.
We now present a simple k-set agreement algorithm for Byzantine synchronous systems, running in ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds. The procedure requires a relatively large number of processes compared to t: we assume n + 1 ≥ k(3t + 1). The procedure was designed with the purpose of tightening the connectivity lower bound, favoring simplicity over the optimality on the number of processes.
Non-faulty processes initially execute a gossip phase for ⌈t/k⌉+1 rounds, followed by a validation phase, and a decision phase, where the output is chosen. Define R = ⌈t/k⌉, and consider the following tree, where nodes are labeled with words over the alphabet P. The root node is labeled as λ, which represents an empty string. Each node w such that 0 ≤ |w| ≤ R has n + 1 child nodes labeled wp for all p ∈ P. Any non-faulty process P i maintains such tree, denoted T i .
All nodes w are associated with the value Cont p (w), called the contents of w. The special value ⊥ represents an absent input. We omit the subscript p when the process is implied or arbitrary. We divide the processes into k disjoint groups: P(g) = {P x ∈ P : x = g mod k}, for 0 ≤ g < k. For any tree T , we call T (g) the subtree of T having only nodes wp ∈ T such that p ∈ P(g).
In the validation phase, if we have a set Q containing (n + 1) − t processes that acknowledge all messages transmitted by process p (making sure that p ∈ Q), at every round 1 ≤ r ≤ R, we call such set the quorum of p, denoted Quorum(p). Formally, Quorum(p) = Q ⊆ P such that p ∈ Q, |Q| ≥ (n + 1) − t, and q ∈ Q whenever Cont(wp) = v implies Cont(wpq) = v, for any wp with Apply completion rule for all wb where b ∈ P \ P ′ and |wb| = ⌈t/k⌉ 13: g ← any g such that T (g) is pivotal ⊲ Decision 14: for ℓ : ⌈t/k⌉ − 1 to 1 do
15:
Apply consensus rule for all non-validated wb where b ∈ P(g) and |wb| = ℓ
0 ≤ |wp| ≤ R. It should be clear that every non-faulty process has a quorum containing at least all other non-faulty processes. If a process p has a quorum as seen by process P i ∈ G, we say that wp has been validated on P i , for any wp with 0 ≤ |wp| < R (and that p has been validated on P i ). Note that in our definition either all entries wp for p ∈ P are validated, or none is. Lemma 6.2, proven in Appendix B, shows that validated entries are unique across non-faulty processes.
Lemma 6.2. If p has been validated on non-faulty processes P i and P j , then Cont i (wp) = Cont j (wp) for any 0 ≤ |w| < R.
In the decision phase, if we see t processes without a quorum, we have technically identified all non-faulty processes B. In this case, we fill R-th round values of any b ∈ B using the completion rule: we make Cont(wb) = v if we have (n + 1) − 2t processes G ′ ⊆ G where Cont(wbg) = v for any g ∈ G ′ and |wb| = R. If a process b has its R-round values completed as above in process P i ∈ G, we say that wb has been completed on P i for any |wb| = R. Lemma 6.3, proven in Appendix B, shows that completed entries are identical and consistent with validated entries across non-faulty processes. (Intuitively, the completion rule was done over identical values from correct processes.) Lemma 6.3. If wp has been completed or validated on a non-faulty process P i , and wp has been completed on a non-faulty process P j , then Cont i (wp) = Cont j (wp).
We have two possible cases: (i) there is a subtree T (g) with less than ⌈t/k⌉ non-validated processes -call such subtree pivotal; or (ii) no such tree exists, in which case we apply the completion rule to R-round values in T (0), and define T (0) as our pivotal subtree instead. A pivotal subtree, therefore, must exist according to the definition above.
Denote the set of processes in the word w as SetProc(w). For any non-validated wb with b ∈ P(g) in a pivotal subtree T (g), where 1 ≤ |wb| < R, we establish consensus on Cont(wb). We apply the consensus rule: Cont(wb) = v if the majority of processes in P(g) \ SetProc(wb) is such that wbp = v. This rule is applied first to entries labeled wb where |wb| = R − 1, and then moving upwards (please refer to Alg. 1). Our algorithm is essentially separating the possible chains of unknown values across disjoint process groups, which either forces one of these chains to be smaller than R = ⌈t/k⌉, or reveals all faulty processes, giving us the ability to perform the completion rule. This fundamental tradeoff underlies our algorithm, and ultimately explains why the ⌈t/k⌉ connectivity bound is tight. Lemma 6.4, proven in Appendix B, shows that the consensus rule indeed establishes consensus across non-faulty processes that identify T (g) as the pivotal subtree.
Lemma 6.4. For any two-non-faulty processes P i and P j that applied the consensus rule on a pivotal subtree T (g), with 0 ≤ g < k, we have that Cont i (p) = Cont j (p) for any p ∈ P(g).
Theorem 6.5. Algorithm 1 solves k-set agreement in ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds.
Proof. Termination is trivial, as we execute exactly R = ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds. By Lemma 6.4, each pivotal subtree yields a unique decision value. As we have at most k pivotal subtrees identified across non-faulty processes, up to k values are possibly decided across non-faulty processes.
Conclusion
In Byzantine synchronous systems, the protocol complex can remain (k − 1)-connected for ⌈t/k⌉ rounds, potentially one more round than in crash-failure systems. We conceive a combinatorial operator modeling the ability of Byzantine processes to equivocate without revealing their Byzantine nature, just after ⌊t/k⌋ rounds of crash failures. We compose this operator with the regular crashfailure operators, extending (k −1)-connectivity up to ⌈t/k⌉ rounds. We tighten this bound, at least when n is relatively large compared to t, via a full-information protocol that solves a formulation of k-set agreement.
It may be surprising that Byzantine failures impose only one additional synchronous round over the crash-failure model, and at most that in our standard setting, where inputs are arbitrarily attributed to processes, and the number of processes is strictly bigger than k(3t + 1). In terms of solvability vs. number of rounds, the penalty for moving from crash to Byzantine failures can thus be quite limited. Previous work has hinted this possibility operationally, since (i) in synchronous systems where n is large enough compared to t, we can simulate crash failures on Byzantine systems with a 1-round delay [2] ; and (ii) techniques similar to the reliable broadcast of [4, 25] deal with the problem of Byzantine equivocation, also with a 1-round delay. This extra round is crucialbut enough -to limit the impact of Byzantine behavior in rather usual operational settings.
